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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
What are the benefits of financial integration for developing and emerging economies?  
 
Economic theory tells us that financial integration brings four types of benefits: 
  First, financial integration potentially allows risk sharing. As in the basic portfolio 
allocation model, global diversification reduces the portfolio risk for a given expected 
rate of return. In turn, this reduction in risk affects domestic saving.  
  Second, financial integration potentially reduces the capital scarcity constraint a 
developing/emerging economy might face.  
  Third, financial integration may bring foreign direct investments (FDI) in the country. 
Part of the income generated with this FDI remains in the country because of taxes or 
other trickle down effects. 
  Finally, financial integration may boost productivity through a number of channels. For 
instance, when financial integration takes the form of FDI, foreign investors bring into 
the country, not only capital, but their technology as well. 
 
However, there is mixed empirical evidence that capital account liberalization and financial 
integration have resulted in additional long-run economic growth in developing economies (see 
the recent survey by Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sløk (2002a)). 
 
How can we reconcile theoretical prediction with empirical evidence? The absence of clear 
empirical evidence on the benefits of financial integration can result from the fact that the 
benefits listed above exist but are small, either because financial integration is not completed yet 
or because there is not much to gain even under complete financial integration. The gap 
between theoretical prediction and empirical evidence can also come from the fact that, in 
addition to the benefits pointed out by economic theory, financial integration brings potential 
losses (associated for instance with sudden stops, reverse capital flows) that cancel out the 
benefits.       
 
The aim of this paper is to give a measure of the potential benefits that countries could have 
seen given the nature of their financial integration and its level. To do so, we build and calibrate 
a stochastic growth model that encompasses most of the features that are supposed to convert 
financial integration into economic growth for 32 developing and emerging economies. The aim 
of this calibration is to derive an upper bound (indeed, we consider only the potential benefits of 
financial integration and completely neglect potential losses that can arise following sudden 
stops, reverse capital flows, etc.) for the benefits of financial integration of emerging and 
developing economies, given their actual degree of financial integration. This upper bound 
provides a benchmark for econometric studies on the effect of financial integration.  
 
To be more precise, we build a stochastic endogenous growth model for a small open economy 
that can (i) borrow from the rest of the world so as to relax its capital constraint, (ii) invest in 
foreign assets so as to benefit from risk sharing, and (iii) receive FDI. In addition, there are two 
sources of uncertainty in the model, i.e., productivity shocks and foreign prices shocks. We 5 
derive a closed form solution for the risk premium that the country is facing, the optimal 
portfolio choice of the domestic investor, the growth rate of the economy, and the welfare gain 
of financial integration. The model is then calibrated on 32 emerging and developing economies 
for which we can evaluate the upper bound for the welfare gain of financial integration. 
 
For plausible values of the preference parameters, we conclude that the gains from financial 
integration are not huge. These gains are nevertheless significant since they represent about 10 
percent of the existing wealth and, in terms of growth differential, actual financial integration 
brings about an additional 0.4 percentage points compared to growth under financial autarky. 
Note that our assessment leads to gains that are a lot higher than those computed by Gourinchas 
and Jeanne (2004). Comparing actual economies with their fully integrated counterpart, they 
obtain a gain from financial integration that only represents around 1 percent of consumption 
each year along the growth path of the economy. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides measures of financial integration of 
emerging and developing economies, and briefly discusses the empirical evidence on the effects 
of financial integration on economic growth and volatility. In Section III, we develop and solve 
a simple stochastic endogenous growth model that encompasses the main theoretical features 
linking financial integration, growth, and volatility. In Section IV the model is calibrated on 32 
emerging and developing economies; we then compute an upper bound for the effect of 
observed financial integration on economic growth. Finally, in Section V, we check the 
robustness of our evaluation of the welfare gain from financial integration by calibrating the 
model under different assumptions. Section VI concludes.         
 
 
II.   FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: FACTS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
A.   Measuring Financial Integration 
There is not yet a measure of the intensity of financial integration that is widely used by 
economists. Existing measures of financial integration, including that of Quinn (1997) that 
looks at capital account regulations, focus on potential financial integration rather than on actual 
financial integration. Using Quinn’s measure of financial integration, a country that imposed no 
restrictions on capital flows but that received or sent little capital flows, would qualify as 
financial integrated without actually benefiting from financial integration.      
 
Table 1 presents two measures of actual financial integration for 32 emerging and developing 
economies. The first one (index 1) is the ratio of the sum of all claims and liabilities of a 
country to its GDP. Its components are also given for G3 economies (U.S., Japan, and 
Germany) so as to provide a benchmark against which actual financial integration of developing 
and emerging economies can be compared.  
 
The second measure (index 2) excludes government and monetary authority claims and 
liabilities; it is the ratio of claims on foreign assets (excluding foreign exchange reserves) and 
liabilities (excluding public and public-guaranteed debt) of a country to its GDP. Index 2 aims 6 
at measuring the part of financial integration that is not channeled by the government and the 
monetary authorities of the country. 
 
Within our set of 32 emerging and developing economies, we distinguish two sub-sets.  The 
first one includes economies that are more financially integrated than the average country of our 
sample; the second sub-set includes economies that are less financially integrated than the 
average country of our sample.
2 In what follows, we will refer to these two groups as LIEs (Less 
Integrated Economies) and MIEs (More Integrated Economies).  
 
Figures in Table 1 show that the intensity and nature of financial integration differ a lot from 
one group to another, and across regions. Index 1 varies from 0.42 for LIEs to 0.88 for MIEs. 
For both LIEs and MIEs, the main component of index 1 is government and government-
guaranteed debts (31 percent of GDP for LIEs and 35 percent of GDP for MIEs). For MIEs, the 
second largest component is claims on foreign assets (excluding foreign exchange reserves), 
which amount to 33 percent of GDP. For LIEs, it is foreign exchange reserves. As measured by 
index 1, financial integration is as high in MIEs as it is in G3 economies. However, the nature of 
financial integration differs considerably between these emerging economies and G3 
economies. The typical MIE has a foreign debt of more than 50 percent of GDP and receives 
FDI, whereas G3 economies exhibit a high index of financial integration thanks to their 
holdings of foreign assets 
 
Index 2, which excludes government and monetary authorities, ranges from 0.26 for LIEs to 
0.75 for MIEs. The main component of index 2 is the stock of FDI for both LIEs (12 percent of 
GDP) and MIEs (19 percent of GDP). For MIEs, the stock of private debt (18 percent of GDP) 
is close to that of FDI, and equity liabilities amount to a mere 3 percent of GDP. For LIEs, 
private foreign debt is only 6 percent of GDP and equity liabilities amount to only 1 percent of 
GDP. 
 
Put together, these figures show that for developing and emerging economies, actual financial 
integration takes place through FDI and debt. Therefore, gains of financial integration should 
mainly be related to these two components of financial integration. Moreover, with equity 
liabilities that are only 3 percent of GDP (at most), stock market liberalization, although a 
potential source of gains, should not be responsible for a large share of the benefit of actual 
financial integration. Finally, as shown in the bottom line of Table 1, developing and emerging 
economies in our sample are net borrowers; at the country level, because foreign assets are more 
than offset by debt, there is no risk sharing. 
                                                 
2 See Appendix 4. 7 
 
B.   Empirical Evidence 
Research aiming at measuring benefits of financial integration usually proceeds by comparing 
two economies that differ in their level of financial integration. But there are at least three types 
of comparisons. The comparison can be between an economy with financial autarky and its 
fully financially integrated counterpart. This is the approach followed by most papers based on 
the calibration of small theoretical models; it focuses on the potential gain of full financial 
integration (see, for example, Obtsfeld (1994), or Athanasoulis and Van Wincoop (2000)). A 
second approach consists in comparing an actual economy with its fully financially integrated 
counterpart. This is the approach followed by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2004). Finally, a third 
approach consists in comparing the economic performance of an actual economy (with its 
current level of financial integration) to its counterpart under a lower level of financial 
integration or under financial autarky. This is the approach followed in econometric studies. 
This paper follows this approach as well. 
 
Evaluating the potential gain of financial integration by calibrating small theoretical models, 
Obtsfeld (1994) and Athanasoulis and Van Wincoop (2000) found that risk- sharing gains that 
would come with financial integration are huge. However, in a deterministic growth model in 
which, by construction, risk sharing does not bring any benefit, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2004) 
show that the welfare gain from capital account liberalization is rather small (around 1 percent 
of consumption each year along the growth path of the economy). As far as the effect of capital 
account liberalization on volatility is concerned, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003) conclude by 
reviewing the literature on international business cycles, that theoretical models (RBC models, 
NOEM models) do not provide a clear guide to the effects of financial integration on 
macroeconomic volatility. A recent paper by Tille (2004) confirms this conclusion. In a two-
country NOEM model, he shows that the impact of integration is not universally beneficial (it 
depends on the degree to which exchange rate fluctuations are passed through to consumer 
prices).  
 
The comparison of economies at different stages of their financial integration process provides 
mixed empirical evidence that capital account liberalization promotes long-run economic 
growth in developing economies (see Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sløk (2002a)’s survey). 
Performing econometric estimations using a new dataset, Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sløk 
(2002b) do not find any significant positive effect of financial integration on economic growth. 
However, Henry (2003) reports empirical evidence that stock market liberalizations (a 
component of capital account liberalization and financial integration) are followed by lower cost 
of capital, higher investment, and higher growth. Finally, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001, 
2004a) report that, on average, equity market liberalizations lead to a 1 percent increase in 
economic growth over a five-year period. 
 
Empirical literature is also mixed regarding the effect of financial openness on macroeconomic 
volatility. For example, Razin and Rose (1994) find no evidence of a link between trade and 
financial openness and macroeconomic volatility. A recent paper by Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz 
(2000) concludes that neither financial openness nor volatility of capital flows has a significant 8 
impact on macroeconomic volatility. They show, however, that a higher level of development of 
the domestic financial sector (as measured by private credit to GDP) reduces growth volatility. 
Buch, Dopke, and Pierdzioch (2002) do not find any consistent empirical relationship between 
financial openness and the volatility of output. Nevertheless, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 
(2004b) find a significant decrease in both GDP and consumption growth variability after equity 
market liberalizations. 
 
In this paper, we follow the approach that consists in comparing an actual economy to an 
economy that is less financially integrated. However, we do not rely on econometric 
estimations, but rather on the calibration of a theoretical model. Therefore, we provide a 
theoretical framework to understand the mixed empirical results reviewed above. Moreover, our 
model considers simultaneously the potential effects of FDI, of the openness of financial 
markets, and of risk-sharing on both growth and volatility.   
 
 
III.   THE SMALL OPEN ECONOMY STOCHASTIC ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL  
To measure the gain from financial integration, we extend a standard macroeconomic model to 
account for financial integration:  
  First, in the financially integrated economy, the representative agent has access to 
global financial markets. She can hold riskless foreign bonds and contract debt (either 
to consume or invest in domestic capital). Both foreign bonds and debt are 
denominated in foreign currency. The agent chooses the amount of debt and bonds that 
she holds. Depending on her net position, the agent pays or receives interests. Note 
that, in our model, the representative agent does not have access to foreign risky 
capital. 
  Second, the financially integrated economy receives FDI, the amount of which is not 
decided by the representative agent. This FDI is converted into productive capital and 
used for production. The income generated by this FDI goes partly to their foreign 
owners; the rest stays in the country. An equilibrium condition ensures that for the 
foreign investors, the certainty equivalent of the return on FDI matches that of 
international riskless bonds.  
 
The rest of the model is a standard AK model with technological shocks. In addition, the 
representative agent consumes domestic and imported goods, foreign prices are subject to 
shocks, and part of the domestic production is exported. The trade balance, and current and 
capital accounts simultaneously adjust to ensure balance of payment equilibrium. Note that later 
in the paper the term “autarky economy” refers to an economy that is in financial autarky but 
trades with the rest of the world. The model is presented below.     9 
 




The small open economy produces one good using capital. The technology is AK, and 
temporary technological shocks perturb the production process. Over the period (t, t+dt), the 
flow of output is: 
() YY Y dYK d t d z    (1) 
where  Y dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process  )) 1 , 0 ( ) ( ; ) ( ( N t dt t dzY     . 
Equation (1) asserts that the flow of output over the period (t+dt) consists of two components: a 
deterministic component ( dt K Y  ) and a stochastic one ( Y Ydz K ) reflecting the random 
influences that impact on the production. Thus, as far as productivity is concerned, shocks are 
neither correlated nor persistent. 
 
In the absence of financial integration, the whole stock of productive capital installed in the 
country is owned by the domestic representative agent.  
 
With financial integration, additional productive capital (K*) comes from FDI. This FDI, owned 
by foreign investors, is used for production. The rest of the stock of capital (Kd) is owned by the 
representative agent so K = Kd + K*. We define * to be the ratio of foreign-owned capital to 
domestically-owned capital (*= K*/Kd). In the autarky economy, * = 0. In the financially 
integrated economy, we suppose that * is constant over time, an assumption that permits us to 
derive a closed-form solution for the representative agent inter-temporal allocation problem. 
Finally, we will later
3 allow the deterministic productivity to depend on the ratio of foreign-
owned capital to domestically-owned capital, so y = y(*). 
 
Sharing income from production 
 
Income generated with capital owned by the domestic agent goes to the domestic agent (who 
still has to pay interest on his foreign debt). In addition, a fraction  of the income generated 
with foreign-owned capital (FDI) goes to the domestic agent to account, for instance, for taxes 
or any trickle down effect;
4 the rest of the income generated by FDI goes to their foreign 
owners. 
 
Thus, before interest payments/revenues on foreign debt/claims, the domestic agent income is 
given by: 
                                                 
3 See section IV.D of the paper. 




y Y Y K dz * 1       
 
Foreign owners of FDI receive the fraction (1- ) of the income generated by their capital that is 
not kept by the domestic agent. Therefore, the revenue from their investment is: 
  
   
d
y Y Y y Y Y K dz K dz * ) 1 ( * ) 1 (         	   	  
 
This income is stochastic. We impose the condition that for FDI owners, the certainty 
equivalent return on risky domestic capital is equal to the riskless rate on foreign bonds (i*):  
 
   
2 11 / 2 * Y y E i      		 	                          (2) 
 

 is the foreign investor’s risk aversion, and  E  is the expected rate of depreciation of the 
domestic nominal exchange rate against the foreign investor currency.  
 
Note that condition (2) is not sufficient to determine endogenously the amount foreign investors 
are willing to invest in the country. It just says that foreign investors are indifferent between 
holding riskless foreign bonds and holding risky domestic productive capital. This condition 
satisfied, investors can invest any amount in the small open economy. Their participation is 
measured by *  , the ratio of foreign-owned capital to domestically-owned capital. We take  *   
as an exogenous parameter. Moreover, under the assumption that this ratio is constant over time, 
the flow of foreign investment into the economy is proportional to investment of domestic 
agents into domestic capital
5. 
 
B.   Other Features of the Model 
 
The representative household consumes a domestically-produced good ( D C ) and an imported 
one ( M C ). Total consumption in terms of domestic currency then depends on both the price of 
the imported good denominated in foreign currency and the exchange rate. 
 
                                                 
5 We do not model the behavior of the foreign investor but make sure he is indifferent between 
investing in riskless bonds in his country and risky FDI in the developing country. The 
assumption that his participation to the economy is constant over time implies that the stock of 
FDI he owns grows at the developing economy growth rate. In order to model the behavior of 
the foreign investor one would have to consider a multi-country model. This is not what is done 
in this paper.  11 
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with  0, 1   , and 1   .  
  is the relative risk aversion coefficient of the domestic agent (and we suppose it is equal to 
that of the foreign investor).  is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.  0 L  is the 
population size at the initial date which is assumed to be unitary ( 0 1 L  ) and n is the population 
growth rate. Domestically-produced and imported consumptions are aggregated according to a 
Cobb-Douglas function, so 
￿ ￿ ￿ 1
Mt DtC C  gives the aggregate consumption. 
 
 
Trade, Real and Nominal Exchange Rates 
 
Let P be the price of the imported good denominated in foreign currency. We assume that P 
follows a geometric Brownian motion: 
P P P dz dt
P
dP
           
where  P dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process. Therefore, the price of the imported 
goods grows at a constant rate  P   continuously perturbed by shocks.  P  is the instantaneous 
standard deviation of the growth rate. We assume that productivity shocks and shocks on P are 
uncorrelated ( 0  Y Pdz dz ). 
 
Total consumption in terms of domestic currency or domestic goods (the price of the 
domestically produced good is taken as numeraire) is: DM CE P C  where E is the nominal 
exchange rate defined as the number of domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency. EP 
is therefore the price of the imported good in terms of domestic currency. The nominal 
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Wealth Accumulation, Capital Mobility, and the Flow of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
  In the autarky economy, the representative agent has no access to foreign financial 
market, and the only way of saving is investment in risky domestic capital. Wealth 
evolution is then given by: 
 
 Y DM Y Y dW dK K C EPC dt K dz   	      
 
  When the economy is financially integrated, the representative agent can hold equity 
claims on domestic capital and riskless foreign bonds (B>0). She can also contract debt 
denominated in foreign currency (B<0). Therefore, domestic wealth is split into two 
components: capital owned by domestic agents (
d K ) and foreign debt/assets (EB): 
d W KE B     
 
Wealth evolution is as follows: 
 
* (1 *) ( ) ( ) (1 *)
d d
Y ED M Y Y dW K EB i C EPC dt K dz          	         
      
Balance of Payments 
 
The balance of payments equilibrium is always satisfied: 
 
 0 ) ( ) * ( ) ( * ) 1 ( ) (
) ( * ) * ( ) ( * ) 1 ( ) (
Payments   of   Balance
Account Current 
Balance   Trade
 	    	 	 	  
	     	 	 	 	 
￿
                               
                                    
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IV.   SOLVING THE MODEL 
The resolution of the model is given in Appendix 1. In this section, we present the main findings 
on portfolio allocation, growth, and volatility and finally, the welfare gain of financial 
integration. 
 
A.   Portfolio Allocation 
In the autarky economy, there is no portfolio choice since the only asset available to the 
representative agent is domestic capital 
 13 
Under financial integration, maximizing the utility function subject to the wealth accumulation 
equation provides expressions for the share of the two assets (as well as for consumption of the 
imported good and domestically-produced good) in the composition of the wealth of the 
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As in any other portfolio choice, the optimal portfolio composition depends on expected returns 
and risk. The share of domestic capital in the domestic agent’s portfolio can be larger than one, 
meaning that the domestic investor borrows abroad to invest in domestic capital. The fact that 
the economy benefits from FDI (>0) increases the determinist part of the return on domestic 
capital for the domestic agent and thus his incentive to borrow abroad to invest at home. It 
increases as well the volatility of this return, thus limiting the incentive to borrow.    
 
In the case where the economy does not benefit from foreign investment ( 0   ), condition (2) 
implies that the expected return on domestic capital adjusted for risk is the same as the one on 
claims on foreign assets. Therefore, the domestic agent holds half of her wealth as domestic 
capital, the other half being invested abroad for diversification purposes. 
 
B.   Growth 
In the autarky economy, the deterministic part of the GDP growth rate is: 
AA
Y g A  	 
where A
A is the propensity to consume wealth, equal to:  (1 )
AA A nC E q 	  	  	  where Ceq
A 
is the certainty equivalent of the return on wealth. This expression for the marginal propensity 
to consume is standard. Note that, thanks to the recursive utility specification, it is clear that the 
effect on A
A of the certainty equivalent Ceq
A depends on the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution. When the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is less than one, a higher Ceq
A 
increases the propensity to consume, and hence reduces the growth rate of the economy. In turn, 
risk aversion does affect the relationship between risk and Ceq
A.: 
 
   
2 2













When the economy is financially integrated, the deterministic part of the economy growth rate 
is: 
(1 *) (1 )( * )
LL
KY K E g nn i A     	  	                (4.a) 14 
 
A
L, the constant propensity to consume wealth, is equal to:  
 
(1 )
LL A nC E q 	  	  	                                                                     (4.b) 
 
where Ceq
L is the certainty equivalent of the return on wealth, which depends on the portfolio 
allocation. It is equal to: 
 
     
2 2
(1 *) (1 *) (1 ) * (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
22
L Y P
ky k k E P E CEq n n n i
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In the financially integrated economy, part of the certainty equivalent of the return on wealth 
comes from foreign debt/assets, and part of it comes from domestic capital income (net of the 
income that goes to foreign investors). 
  In a net borrowing country ( 1 K n  ), the stock of physical capital is higher both because 
domestic agents borrow abroad to invest at home and because there are  FDI flows. The 
component of the certainty equivalent of the return on domestic activity due to 
deterministic productivity increases, but the component linked to the stochastic part 
(which reduces Ceq
L) rises as well.  
  In the case of net lenders ( 1 K n  ), it is even more ambiguous since more wealth comes 
from foreign investors, but domestic agents now devote part of their wealth to invest 
abroad.  
 
The condition for international financial integration to spur growth is that
LA g g  . This 
condition is not met for any set of parameters.  
 
In the simplest case where the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is equal to 1, and the 
country is neither a lender nor a borrower, financial integration spurs growth (one can show that 
g
L – g
A = y > 0) through FDI. Moreover, when the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 
is equal to one, one can show that the derivatives of g
L – g
A to nk are always positive, which 
means that the more debt the country holds, the higher its growth rate. Let us recall though that 
the optimal amount of debt is not a parameter, but is endogenously determined within the 
model. 
  
When the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is different from one, the effect of financial 
integration on growth is ambiguous and cannot be analyzed analytically. Therefore, we rely on 
calibration experiments in the next section.  
 15 
C.   Volatility 
Volatility in the Growth Rate of Wealth 
 
Wealth volatility in a financially integrated economy (denoted
L vol ) is: 
 
2 2 2 *) 1 ( Y K
L n vol       
 
Comparing this volatility with that of wealth in the autarky economy (denoted 
A vol ) gives: 





                              (5) 
 
In the case of a net borrower country ( 1 K n  ), financial integration increases total wealth 
volatility. Moreover, the larger the stock of FDI, the higher the volatility. For countries that are 
net lenders ( 1 K n  ), current account liberalization may either increase or decrease wealth 
volatility.  
 
Volatility in the Growth Rate of Consumption 
 
Solving the maximization problem provides expressions for the consumption of imported and 
domestic goods (see appendix 1): 
 













    
 
The volatility of the growth rate of total nominal consumption ( D M C EPC  ) and that of 
domestic consumption are the same as that of wealth since they both are a constant part of 
wealth. This is not the case for the volatility of imported consumption, which is (see appendix 
1): 
 
2 ( )    with    ,
ii
MP vol C vol i A L       
 
Volatility of the growth rate of aggregate consumption is then (see appendix 1): 
 

2 2 1 ) 1 ( P
i i
M D vol C C vol  

￿ ￿ 	  
￿   with i=A,L 
 
Consumption volatility is higher than that of output owing to foreign price volatility. Moreover, 
consumption volatility is higher in the financially integrated economy than in the autarky 
economy as soon as wealth volatility is higher in the financially integrated economy.   
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D.   Welfare Gain of Financial Integration 
Total Welfare Gain from Financial Integration  
 
The welfare gain from financial integration is computed as the percentage of her current wealth 
the domestic representative agent should receive to be as well off in the autarky economy as she 
is in the financially integrated one.
6 We denote by k this percentage. Note that at the time t=s of 
the switch, the wealth of the agent is  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( s K s EB s K s W
d    which means that the wealth 
is at the same level before and after the switch, but its composition differs. After the switch, it is 
only made up of domestic capital. 
 
The value functions for the optimal program or the indirect utilities of the two economies are as 
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Splitting-up the Welfare Gain of Financial Integration  
 
In order to appraise whether the welfare gain from financial integration comes from FDI or from 
the openness to foreign debt/assets, we break down the total welfare gain computed previously. 
 
To split the total welfare gain from financial integration, we consider three different economies. 
Two of them have already been considered above, i.e., the autarky economy and the actual 
economy. We consider a third economy that receives FDI, but is closed to other capital flows. 
We then proceed in two stages illustrated in Figure 1. First, we consider the switch from the 
actual economy to an economy with FDI but no access to global financial markets; this allows 
us to compute the welfare gain from access to global financial markets. Next, we consider the 
switch from the latter economy to autarky, and this gives us the welfare gain of FDI.   
 
                                                 
6 The definition we use is the compensating variation. 17 
Let’s note 
PL V , the optimal value of the program of an economy with FDI but no other capital 
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The welfare gain from access to financial markets is then computed as the percentage of her 
wealth the domestic representative agent should receive to be as well off in the economy where 

















k           (7) 
 
Finally, the welfare gain from FDI is the percentage of her wealth the domestic representative 
agent should receive to be as well off in the autarky economy as she is in the economy with FDI 

















k         (8) 
The three welfare gains are such that: 
 
(1 ) 1 1
FDI AFM kk k          
 
 
V.   MEASURING THE WELFARE GAIN FROM FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 
A.   The Data 
In order to measure the upper bound for the welfare effect of financial integration, we calibrate 
our model on 32 developing and emerging economies over the period 1990-98. Our aim is to 
measure the welfare gain of a country representative agent that would result from the observed 
level of financial integration of that country in the specific (and optimistic) case where no costly 
side effects of financial integration hurt the country.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 contain common and country specific parameters used in the calibration. 
Common parameters (Table 2) are set to standard values with a discount rate of 2 percent; an 
international interest rate of 4 percent, an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution set at 0.5, and 
a risk aversion of 5. Robustness of our results to preference parameters and the international 
interest rate is checked for additional values indicated in Table 2. 
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Country specific parameters (see Table 3) have been computed using the Penn World table (HS 
6.1) and the data base on stock of international wealth put together by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti 
(2001). For our evaluation, the two most important parameters are *  , the ratio of foreign-
owned capital to domestically-owned capital and  K n , the share of domestic capital in the 
representative agent’s wealth. The mean value of  K n  is 1.09, just above unity and ranges from 
0.73 (Botswana) to 1.42 (Pakistan). Among the 32 countries we consider, only 7 of them are net 
lenders (Botswana, China, Egypt, Malaysia, Panama, South Africa, and Venezuela). The ratio of 
foreign-owned capital to domestically-owned capital varies from 0 (Syria), which means that 
there is no FDI in this country, to 0.22 (Malaysia), which means that 18 percent of the physical 
capital installed in Malaysia is owned and managed by foreigners. 
 
B.   Calibration Issues 
Our theoretical model has been solved under the hypothesis that the representative agent 
maximizes her inter-temporal utility. In doing so, she allocates her wealth between domestic 
capital and debt/assets abroad according to her tastes, returns, and risk. She also determines her 
savings and consumption according to her tastes. We had no difficulties calibrating the inter-
temporal choice of the domestic agents of the countries we studied. The portfolio choices were 
trickier to reproduce. 
 
Actual data show that the volatility of emerging and developing economies, although higher 
than that of industrialized economies, is low compared to the excess return of domestic 
investment for the representative agent. This should lead emerging and developing economies to 
borrow a lot abroad to invest at home, or, in our setting, a high nk. This is not what we observe 
in the data. Numbers reported in Table 3 for actual nk show that it is above but close to one, 
much lower than what one would expect.  
 
Our calibration strategy is then to stick to the nk observed in the data and consider that this low 
level of indebtedness results from borrowing constraints that prevent emerging countries from 
holding their optimal portfolio. Consequences of this strategy will be discussed later in the 
paper. Note, however, that since portfolio choices and consumption-saving decisions are 
independent, the value function of the programs still holds under portfolio constraint. Thus, the 
value function of the program can be used to evaluate the welfare gain from financial 
integration.  
 
Calibration runs as follows. We used equation (2) and the system composed of equations (4.a)-
(4.c) to find the parameter , which measures the share of production using FDI that goes to 
domestic agent, the parameter E, the expected change in the nominal exchange rate, and the 
productivity parameter Y. Note that condition (2) still holds when the domestic agent is 
constrained in her borrowings. Indeed, this condition is derived from the perspective of foreign 
agents owning FDI in the country who are not affected by the borrowing constraint. It is the 
expression of the optimal share  K n  (Equation 3) which is no longer valid under the borrowing 
constraint. 
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The growth rate of the economy (g
L), the volatility (Y), and the portfolio allocation nk are taken 
from the data (see Table 3). We calibrated the model for each country as well as for the average 
country, which we define as a country with country-specific parameters set to the mean of the 
sample. 
 
Table 4 contains the outcome of this calibration process. Recall that the parameter  measures 
the extent to which a country benefits from FDI. Our calibration indicates that for the average 
country of our sample, 37 percent of the production on foreign-owned plants goes to the 
domestic agent; in our sample, it ranges from a mere 2 percent to 51 percent, with a mean of 25 
percent. The expected annual depreciation of emerging market currency against the dollar 
ranges from 0 percent to 8 percent, lower than actual between 1990 and 1998. 
     
C.   Evaluating the Welfare Gain from Financial Integration 
We now use the calibrated model to compute the welfare gain from financial integration. Recall 
that we compare actual economies with economies under financial autarky. And the question we 
answer is the following: by how much should the total wealth of the representative agent be 
increased for her to accept to switch back to financial autarky? This is what we call the welfare 
gain from financial integration. It is computed using equation (6).This gain is then split into two 
components: the gain from FDI (equation 8) and the gain from access to global financial 
markets (the ability to borrow and/or to invest abroad) (equation 7). Finally, we compute the 
difference in the growth rates of the two economies (the actual one and the one in financial 
autarky) and their relative volatility (equation 5). Results are shown in Table 5.  
 
For the average country of our sample, the gain from financial integration is around 11 percent 
of the representative agent’s wealth, and the gain comes equally from FDI (4.9 percent of 
wealth) and from access to global financial markets (5.6 percent). Compared to autarky 
economies, we calculate that, on average, actual economies enjoy an additional 0.31 percentage 
points of annual growth. This comes at the cost of more volatility, which is 25 percent higher in 
actual economies compared to the autarky situation.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of production, consumption, and capital accumulation in the 
two economies. The plain line refers to actual economies as described in our model, and the 
dotted line refers to the autarky economy. Let us consider what happens to the economy at the 
time the representative agent agrees to switch back to autarky and is compensated so as to keep 
inter-temporal utility the same. At the beginning, the representative agent is richer (her wealth 
increases by the compensating amount she receives), but there is less productive capital 
available in the autarky economy since it is closed to FDI. As a result, GDP is lower in the 
autarky economy, while GNI (GDP less interest and dividend payments) is almost the same in 
the two economies (note that in the autarky economy, GNI is equal to GDP). Propensity to 
consume wealth is higher in the actual economy than in the autarky one, but because wealth is 
initially higher in the autarky economy, it turns out that initial consumption is higher too in the 
autarky economy. From this initial situation, all macroeconomic aggregates in each economy 
grow at the same rate, which is lower in the autarky economy and eventually the two economies 
diverge. The divergence process is slow. In our calibration, because the difference in the annual 20 
growth rates is small (around 0.3 percent per year), it takes around twenty years for 
consumption in the integrated economy to catch up with that in the autarky economy. The 
dashed line in Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of the autarky economy in which no 
compensation is provided to the representative agent at the time she leaves the financially 
integrated economy. This economy exhibits the same growth rate as the autarky economy with 
compensation paid, but starts at a lower level. The comparison of these two economies gives us 
a measure of the compensation in terms of permanent consumption. It is straightforward to 
show that it is equal to the percentage compensation in terms of initial wealth. Thus, the welfare 
gain of financial integration can be also evaluated at around 11 percent of permanent 
consumption.  
 
It is of interest to distinguish the welfare gain from financial integration by level of financial 
integration and by region. It is no surprise that the gain from financial integration is higher for 
countries that are more financially integrated since we measure the gain from complete financial 
autarky to the actual level of financial integration. However, one can notice that the gain from 
financial integration in terms of annual growth rates is not that high. Our calibration says that 
more financially integrated economies would grow by an additional 0.42 percentage points 
compare to autarky, while less financially integrated economies grow by an additional 0.16 
percentages point. The difference between these two figures is only 0.26 percentage points per 
year. This rather small number may explain why econometric studies so far have not provided 
clear evidence on the effect of financial integration on economic growth. 
 
Turning to the gain from financial integration by region reported in Table 5, we see that the 
average Asian country benefits more from financial integration than any other region. Financial 
integration indexes reported in Table 1 indicate that Latin America was the most financially 
integrated region, yet our results show that it benefits less from financial integration than Asia; 
the welfare gain from financial integration is equal to 11.6 percent for Asia compared to 9.7 
percent for Latin America. This underscores that the degree of financial integration is not the 
only component of the welfare gain from financial integration; the nature of financial 
integration (FDI, debt) and the capacity of the country to benefit from FDI (parameter ) also 
matter. 
 
D.   Checking for Robustness 
Sensitivity to Preference Parameters and Interest Rate  
 
In order to check for the robustness of the above evaluation of the welfare gain from financial 
integration, we start by modifying preference parameters (risk aversion and inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution) and international interest rates. Table 6 contains the results. The 
welfare gain from financial integration is a decreasing function of all these parameters. An 
international interest rate 1 percent higher reduces the overall evaluation of the welfare gain 
from financial integration by 1 percent (from 10.9 percent to 9.8percent). A higher risk aversion 
translates into a smaller welfare gain. This comes from the fact that financial integration, and 
the foreign borrowing that accompanies it in most emerging economies, increases the volatility 
of gross national income. As a consequence, the more risk averse the representative agent, the 21 
smaller the gain from financial integration. In our calibration, changing the risk aversion 
parameter from two to five reduces the welfare gain from 10.9 percent to 8.7 percent. Finally, a 
higher inter-temporal elasticity of substitution reduces the sensitivity of the marginal propensity 
to consume with respect to financial integration. Therefore, the larger the inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution, the smaller the gains from financial integration. 
 
Alternative Calibration Strategy 
 
So far our calibration strategy has been to consider that because of borrowing constraints, 
countries were unable to hold their optimal portfolio. As said before, given the model 
parameters and the relatively low volatility in most emerging countries, our model predicted 
that emerging countries would want to borrow a lot abroad to invest at home. This is not what is 
observed in the data that show that emerging countries are indebted in reasonable proportions 
(with nk slightly above 1). This discrepancy between observed and predicted portfolios could 
also come from the existence of a risk premium on foreign borrowing. Indeed, we have assumed 
so far that investors required a risk premium only on risky FDI, but not on lending that was 
considered as risk-free for the foreign investor.  We now relax this hypothesis and calibrate a 
risk premium (RP) on emerging country borrowing such that the observed nK is optimal. Under 
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the growth rate of the financially integrated economy is: 
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note that equation (2), which expresses the required return on FDIs, remains the same. 
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To calibrate this new version of our model, we keep all the other parameters equal to their value 
in the previous calibration and calculate the RP that exactly solves equation (9). The risk 
premium that we obtain on foreign borrowing is given in Table 7. For the average country, it is 
around 3 percent and varies from 8 percent to – 1 percent. It is higher for more financially 
integrated economies than for less integrated ones. Finally, it is relatively stable across regions.    
 
Table 8 shows that the welfare gain from financial integration is much lower (around 5 percent 
of initial wealth) when we introduce a risk premium, although small, on foreign borrowing. The 
decomposition of the welfare gain shows that the gain from FDI is unchanged compared to the 
previous calibration. On the contrary, the gain from access to global financial markets becomes 
a lot smaller - almost negligible. This is not surprising. The risk premium emerging countries 
have to pay on their debt reduces the benefit they get from borrowing. This was not the case in 
the previous calibration in which they only bear the riskless international interest rate 
augmented for currency depreciation.           
 
Allowing for a Higher Productivity of FDI 
 
In the introduction of this paper, we mentioned that financial integration may provide additional 
benefits to the country when FDI brings in new technology that raises the overall productivity of 
the economy. So far, our model and our calibration strategy do not allow for such an effect. The 
calibration can be easily modified to take it into account and compute its impact on the welfare 
gain from financial integration.  
 
To do so, let us assume that FDI makes capital used in the country (FDI itself + domestic 
capital) more productive. The larger the FDI, the more important this productivity gain. 
Therefore, we assume that the gain in productivity is proportional to the size of the FDI: 
D
Y Y X    *) 1 (   , where 
d
Y   is the productivity in the autarky economy. It is less than  Y   as 
soon as X is positive. In terms of computing the welfare cost of financial integration, we use the 
same calibration for the financially-integrated economy, but reduce to 
d
Y   the productivity 
parameter in the autarky economy. In the calibration below we set X=0.5, which corresponds, 
for the average country in our sample, to a 9 percent increase in the overall productivity in the 
financially-integrated economy.  
 
Results of that experiment are shown in Table 9. Of course, the fact that FDI affects the overall 
productivity does not change the welfare gain from access to global financial markets. The 
welfare gain from FDI is significantly higher. 
 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have calibrated a theoretical model in order to appraise the welfare gains from 
actual financial integration in developing and emerging economies. We provide an upper bound 
to the gains from financial integration since we focus on the potential benefits and neglect 
potential losses. Gains we have computed are not huge, but significant, since they represent 23 
about 10 percent of existing wealth. In particular, the gains in terms of growth differential 
cannot be ignored; actual financial integration brings about 0.3 percentage points of growth per 
year. Moreover, we show that the welfare gains from financial integration are nearly equally 
split between the gains from access to global financial markets and those due to FDI. Finally, 
when we allow for FDI to raise domestic productivity we obtain a large welfare gain with 
financial integration translating into 0.5 percentage points of growth per year.  
 
On average, the gains we derived are higher than those computed by Gourinchas and Jeanne 
(2004). Indeed, they obtain a gain from financial integration that only represents around 1 
percent of consumption each year along the growth path of the economy. Such a discrepancy 
with our measure may come from their different modeling: they consider a deterministic model 
of exogenous growth while we consider an exogenous growth model under uncertainty. It also 
comes from the fact that they measure the potential gain from full financial integration 
compared to the actual level of financial integration while we measure the gain from actual level 
of financial integration compared to financial autarky
7. The approach we follow provides a 
better benchmark for econometric studies, which are based on actual economies. 
 
Even though we derive larger gains from financial integration than Gourinchas and Jeanne 
(2004), the benefit from financial integration we report are not huge. At best, that is when 
financial integration translates into higher productivity, financial integration translate into 
slightly higher annual growth rates (around 0.5 percentage points per year.) Our calibration 
shows, therefore, that it is not surprising that econometric studies struggle to exhibit large 
effects of financial integration on growth.  
                                                 
7 Note that in our endogenous growth model it is impossible to define what would be full 
financial integration. Therefore, we cannot derive a measure of the effect of financial integration 
that would directly compare to that of Gourinchas and Jeanne. 24 
Table 1: Measuring Financial Integration for 32 developing and emerging economies in 1996 
(Ratio to GDP) 
Unless indicated, data come from Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2001). 
(1) is the ratio to GDP of the sum of the estimate of stock of direct investment assets (cumulative flow adjusted for 
relative price variations), the estimate of stock of portfolio equity assets (cumulative flow adjusted for stock market 
price variations), and the sum of cumulative flows of portfolio debt assets, other assets and net errors and 
omissions. 
(2) is the ratio to GDP of total reserves minus gold. 
(3) is the ratio to GDP of gross external debt for developing countries, and the ratio to GDP of  stock of other 
investment liabilities for G3 economies, (3b) is the ratio to GDP of public and publicly guaranteed long term debt 
(World Bank, Global Development Finance), and (3a) = (3) – (3b). 
(4) is the ratio to GDP of the estimate of stock of direct investment liabilities (cumulative flow adjusted for relative 
price variations).  
(5) is the ratio to GDP of the estimate of stock of  portfolio equity liabilities (cumulative flow adjusted for stock 
market price variations). 
 
  Whole 
sample 
 Level  of 
financial 
integration 
 Region    For  memo 






 # of countries   32    12  20    3  8  15  6    3 
- Claim on foreign 
assets (excluding 
FX reserves)  (1) 
0.23    0.06  0.33   0.17  0.11  0.32 0.11    0.45 
- Foreign Exchange 
reserves (2) 
0.14    0.17  0.13   0.38  0.12  0.11 0.15    0.03 
- Foreign Debt (3) 
Of which:  
0.47    0.37  0.53   0.25  0.38  0.48 0.67    0.26 
- Private foreign 
debt (3 a) 
0.14    0.06  0.18   0.09  0.18  0.13 0.09     
- Government 
foreign debt (3 b)  
0.33    0.31  0.35   0.15  0.20  0.35 0.58     
- Stock of FDI (4)  0.17    0.12  0.19    0.07  0.14  0.23  0.11    0.04 
- Stock of equities 
liabilities (5) 
0.02    0.01  0.03   0.02  0.03  0.02 0.01    0.06 
- Financial 
Integration 
                   
- Index 1  
(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)+(5) 
0.71    0.42  0.88   0.74  0.58  0.82 0.47    0.86 
- Index 2  
(1)+(3 a)+(4)+(5) 




-0.10   -0.14  -0.07   0.30  -0.05  -0.05  -0.41   0.22 25 
Table 2: Common Parameters 
Annual discount rate 
 
	   0.02 
Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 
 
   0.5 ; 0.9 ;  
Risk aversion 
 
   2 ; 5  
International nominal interest rate  * i   0.04 ; 0.05 
 
 
Table 3: Country Specific Parameter 
    Source (see also Appendix 2)  mean  max  min 
Population growth rate 
(in percent) 
n  HS 6.1 mean over period 1990-1998  1.9  3.1  0.9 
Ratio of imported goods 
to absorption  
1-
   HS 6.1 mean over the period 1990-1998  0.31  0.81  0.08 
Variance of productivity 
shocks (in percent) 
 
2
y    HS 6.1 variance of the growth rate of the 
economy over the period 1990-1998 
0.08 0.27  0.00 
Trend in price of 
imported goods (foreign 
currency) 
P    HS 6.1 annual mean over the period 
1990-1998 
-0.12 0.06  -0.56 
Price of imported good 
volatility (in percent) 
2
P    HS 6.1 variance of the annual growth 
rate in the price of imported goods over 
the period 1990-1998 
1.67 14.46  0.04 
Share of domestic 
capital in the agent’s 
wealth 
 
K n   HS 6.1 + Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (year 
1996) 
See Appendix 3.  
1.09 1.42  0.73 
Ratio of foreign owned 
capital to domestically 
owned capital 
 
*    HS 6.1 + LM-F (year 1996) 
See Appendix 3.  
0.08 0.22  0.00 
GDP growth rate   L g   HS 6.1 mean over period 1990-1998  0.04  0.09  0.01 
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Table 4: Calibrated Parameters under the Borrowing Constrained Hypothesis 
      Mean max  min  Average 
country 
Share of production from 
foreign owned capital that 
goes to the domestic agent 
 
   0.25 0.51  0.02  0.37 
Expected annual change in 
the nominal exchange rate 
 
E 0.02 0.08  0.00  0.02 
Productivity parameter  Y 
     










0.09 0.18  0.03  0.10 
Note that parameters reported in this table are those derived with common parameters (Table 2) set at the following 
values: i*= 0.04, 
 
Table 5: Welfare Gain from Financial Integration (average country) 
 
 




  Level of financial 
integration 
 Region 




 # of countries   32    12  20    8  15  6 
K  10.9%    6.0%  14%    11.6%  9.7%  5.2% 
k
AFM  5.6%    3.9%  6.0%    7.0%  4.8%  4.6% 
k
FDI  4.9%    1.9%  7.5%    4.2%  4.6%  1.8% 
g
L – g
A   0.31%    0.42%  0.16%    0.31%  0.29%  0.13% 
Vol
L/ Vol
A  1.25    1.26  1.25    1.28  1.29  1.18 














 = 0.9 
 # of countries   32  32  32  32 
k  10.9%  9.8%  8.7%  4.5% 
k
AFM  5.6%  5.1%  4.5%  2.3% 
k
FDI  4.9%  4.5%  4.0%  2.1% 
g
L – g
A   0.31%  0.28%  0.24%  0.10% 
Vol
L/ Vol
A  1.25  1.24  1.23  1.21 27 
Table 7: Calibrated Risk Premium on Foreign Debt  
Whole sample    Level of financial integration    Region 
Mean max  min  Average 
country 




0.03 0.08 -0.01 
 
 
 0.03    0.02  0.05    0.03  0.03  0.02 
Note that parameters reported in this table are those derived with common parameters (Table 2) set at the following 
values: i*= 0.04,  
 
 
Table 8:  Welfare Gain from Financial Integration – Risk Premium Hypothesis 
(average country) 
 








  Level of financial 
integration 
 Region 




 # of countries   32    12  20    8  15  6 
k  4.98%    7.52%  1.96%    4.24%  4.63%  1.85% 
k
AFM  0.01%    0.01%  0.00%    0.03%  0.02%  0.01% 
k
FDI  4.97%    1.96%  7.51%    4.21%  4.61%  1.84% 
g
L – g
A   0.15%    0.16%  0.24%    0.13%  0.15%  0.13% 
Vol
L/ Vol
A  1.25    1.26  1.25    1.28  1.29  1.18 
 Whole 
sample 
  Level of financial 
integration 
 Region 




 # of countries   32    12  20    8  15  6 
k  18.4%    11.4%   22.9%     18.9%   19.6%   9.3%  
k
AFM  5.6%     3.9%   6.0%     7.1%   4.8%   3.3%  
k
FDI  12.1%     7.2%   15.9%     11.1%   14.1%   5.9%  
g
L – g
A   0.49%     0.29%   0.63%     0.47%   0.53%   0.22%  
Vol
L/ Vol
A  1.25     1.26   1.25     1.28   1.29   1.18 28 
Figure 1: Splitting up the Welfare Gain from Financial Integration 
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Appendix 1: Solving the Model 
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where V(t) is the value function of the program. 
We guess a value function of the form: 
(1 )(1 ) 1 1










￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿    		 
 
 
where A is a constant to be calculated. 
 () tt d t EV W ￿ can be calculated using Itô’s lemma: 
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Replacing it into the Bellman equation and using the fact that  0 lim (1 ) 1
y
x x xy ￿    and 
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Maximizing with respect to  D C  and  M C  leads to:  
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Maximizing with respect to (K
d/W) and (EB/W) subject to the constraint that 
d K EB W   
leads to equations (7). 
Replacing the optimal consumptions, capital stock and debt stock in the Bellman equation 
allows getting the expression of the constant A: 
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It then provides equations (8) in the text. 
 
The solution of the program is then: 
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Computation of the consumption volatility is made as follows: 
 
Since  W A EPC
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Appendix 2: Data 
 
Table 10: Data Sources and Definitions 
 
Variable Source  Definition 
Y  Heston , Summer and Aten 6.1.  Real GDP, constant local currency  
I  Heston, Summer, and Aten 6.1.   Investment, constant local currency 
C  Heston, Summer, and Aten 6.1.   Consumption, constant local currency 
G  Heston, Summer, and Aten 6.1.   General government consumption,  local currency 
IM  Heston, Summer, and Aten 6.1.   Importations, constant local currency 
X  Heston, Summer, and Aten 6.1.   Exportations, constant local currency 
IV  Heston, Summer, and Aten 6.1.   Investment, nominal local currency 
E  Heston, Summer, and Aten 6.1.   Nominal Exchange rate, US $ 1 = E local currency 
units 
NEW  Lane and Milesi-Ferreti  Estimate of net external asset position based on 
adjusted cumulative current account, current US$. 
SIL  Lane and Milesi-Ferreti  Estimate of stock of  investment liabilities,  
(cumulative flow adjusted for relative price 
variations)current US$ 
SPL  Lane and Milesi-Ferreti  Estimate of stock portfolio liabilities (cumulative 





Appendix 3: Constructing Capital and Debt Stocks 
 
  K, the total stock of capital available is computed with the perpetual inventory method, 
starting in 1960, and with annual discount factor set at 6%. 
 
1960 1960
1 (1 0.06) , 1960 tt t
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  * K , the stock of capital owned by foreign investors is taken from Lane and Milesi-
Ferreti dataset and converted into constant local currency , and two cases are considered. 
























d K , the stock of capital owned by domestic agents is computed the difference between 
K and K*. 
  *  , the ratio of capital owned by foreign investors to capital owned by domestic agents 
is then  ** /
d K K    
  B, the net debt of the country in current US dollars is computed as its net external 
position as computed by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti minus the value of stock of capital 
owned by foreign investors. Again two cases (excluding and including portfolio 
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Appendix 4: Less Integrated and More Integrated Economies 




















































































































































Algeria 0.10  0.09  0.03  0.00  0.73  0.05  0.67  LI LI LI LI LI 
Argentina 0.19  0.06  0.15  0.04  0.37  0.17  0.21  LI HI HI HI HI 
Bolivia 0.25  0.13  0.23  0.00  0.69  0.13  0.57  HI LI HI HI HI 
Botswana 0.15  0.93  0.12  0.01  0.11  0.00  0.11  LI LI LI HI LI 
Brazil 0.06  0.08  0.10  0.05  0.23  0.11  0.12  LI HI LI LI LI 
Chile 0.10  0.22  0.30  0.07  0.40  0.33  0.07  HI HI HI LI HI 
China 0.16  0.13  0.22  0.00  0.16  0.03  0.13  HI LI LI HI HI 
Colombia 0.12  0.11  0.20  0.01  0.34  0.16  0.17  HI LI HI LI HI 
Costa Rica  0.01  0.11  0.33  0.00  0.39  0.06  0.32  HI LI LI LI LI 
Dominican 
Republic 0.04  0.03  0.19  0.00  0.33  0.06  0.26  HI LI LI LI LI 
Ecuador 0.18  0.10  0.20  0.00  0.76  0.11  0.65  HI LI LI HI HI 
Egypt 0.09  0.26  0.19  0.00  0.46  0.04  0.43  HI LI LI LI LI 
El Salvador  0.07  0.09  0.07  0.00  0.28  0.06  0.22  LI LI LI LI LI 
Guatemala 0.03  0.06  0.16  0.00  0.24  0.07  0.18  HI LI LI LI LI 
India 0.02  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.24  0.04  0.20  LI HI LI LI LI 
Indonesia 0.08  0.08  0.10  0.04  0.57  0.30  0.26  LI HI HI LI HI 
Jamaica 0.13  0.22  0.64  0.00  0.98  0.21  0.77  HI LI HI HI HI 
Korea 0.20  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.24  0.19  0.05  LI HI HI HI HI 
Malaysia 0.15  0.27  0.45  0.00  0.40  0.24  0.16  HI LI HI HI HI 
Mauritius 0.05  0.21  0.07  0.01  0.42  0.15  0.27  LI LI HI LI LI 
Mexico 0.27  0.06  0.25  0.09  0.48  0.19  0.29  HI HI HI HI HI 
Morocco 0.09  0.10  0.10  0.02  0.60  0.02  0.58  LI HI LI LI LI 
Pakistan 0.06  0.01  0.06  0.02  0.46  0.09  0.37  LI HI LI LI LI 
Panama 2.70  0.11  0.28  0.00  0.74  0.11  0.62  HI LI LI HI HI 
Peru 0.00  0.17  0.22  0.02  0.48  0.15  0.33  HI HI HI LI HI 
Philippines 0.18  0.12  0.14  0.03  0.48  0.16  0.32  LI HI HI HI HI 
South Africa  0.32  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.21  0.12  0.08  LI HI LI HI HI 
Syria 0.74  0.16  0.03  0.00  1.28  0.28  1.00  LI LI HI HI HI 
Thailand 0.06  0.21  0.12  0.07  0.50  0.41  0.09  LI HI HI LI HI 
Tunisia 0.15  0.10  0.23  0.03  0.59  0.11  0.48  HI HI LI HI HI 
Turkey 0.08  0.09  0.04  0.02  0.45  0.19  0.27  LI HI HI LI HI 
Venezuela 0.65  0.17  0.15  0.05  0.50  0.11  0.40  HI HI LI HI HI 
Sample 
median 0.12  0.11  0.15  0.01  0.46  0.12  0.27       
(1)-(5): Table 1. (6): According to the classification 1, countries have a low integration if their stock of direct investment is 
less than that of the median country. (7): According to the classification 2, countries have a low integration if their stock of 
portfolio equity liabilities is less than that of the median country. (8): According to the classification 3, countries have a low 
integration if their private debt is less than that of the median country. (9): According to the classification 4, countries have a 
low integration if their Claim on foreign assets excluding reserves is less than that of the median country. We conclude that 
an economy has a low integration if it is not integrated with respect to at least 2 of the previous classifications. 35 
 
Table 12: Distinguishing between LIEs (Less Integrated Economies) and MIEs (More 
Integrated Economies)  
12 Less Integrated Economies    20 More Integrated Economies 
Algeria Morocco    Argentina  Mexico 
Botswana Pakistan    Bolivia  Panama 
Brazil     Chile  Peru 
Costa Rica      China  Philippines 
Dominican Republic      Colombia  South Africa 
Egypt     Ecuador  Syria 
El Salvador      Indonesia  Thailand 
Guatemala     Jamaica  Tunisia 
India     Korea  Turkey 
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